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From Kierkegaard to Kennedy:
Existentialist Philosophy in the
Supreme Court's Decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Its
Effect on the Right to Privacy
by REBECCA RABKIN*
I. Introduction
In the landmark 1992 abortion rights case, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,' the Supreme Court advanced a novel constitutional
perspective. The plurality's decision in that case added a new
dimension to the right to privacy, which until that point had focused
mainly on rights of physical autonomy, relating to reproduction, birth
control, and abortion.2 In Casey, the plurality articulated a new
aspect of this right, deemed to be implicit in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment: a right to philosophical privacy. In
creating this new right, the Casey plurality embraced the ideals of
existentialist philosophy, echoing some of existentialism's most
fundamental tenets in the language of the decision.4
Like the existentialists' rejection of the Platonic idea of "Forms"
as eternal truths, and other traditional philosophies, the Casey
plurality rejected the notion that there exists a prevailing right or
wrong on the issue of abortion, and acknowledged that every person
* Rebecca Rabkin is a native of Seattle, Washington. She earned her Bachelor of
Arts in Comparative History of Ideas at the University of Washington in 1999. Ms.
Rabkin is a J.D. candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
class of 2005 and the Managing Editor of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 2004-
2005.
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 505 U.S. at 851.
4. Id.
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has a right to determine their own ideas about existence.' In refusing
to recognize the existence of moral truth regarding abortion, the
plurality rejected traditional Judeo-Christian moral standards,
standing with Nietzsche to declare, "God is dead."6 According to the
Casey plurality, religious morality should not be foisted on society
with the strength of judicial or legislative determinations, leaving
decisions about human life and death up to the individual alone.7
One of the central themes of existentialist philosophy, individual
choice and autonomy, is at the heart of the plurality's decision in
Casey. In that decision, the plurality recognized the importance of
individual decision-making in regard to intimate issues such as
abortion.' It allows women to decide, through their own experiences,
what is right for them and their families. In this way, it recognized
another of existentialism's fundamental truths: that the individual is
inherently alone in creating and facing their life circumstances, and
should likewise be allowed to resolve them alone. Like Camus'
Sisyphus, each person holds the key to his or her own salvation.9
Likewise, the Casey plurality followed in the footsteps of the
existentialists in accepting that life is full of sorrow and pain.' ° The
plurality does not suggest that abortion is an easy decision, or that a
woman contemplating abortion is not sorrowful over her decision."
Rather, it notes that such intimate decisions are painful and intense,
and that it is only through careful contemplation and action that the
proper decision can be made. 2 In this way, the court exalts personal
experience over the imposed judgment of the state or the courts.
Implicit in the Casey plurality's decision is a question long
debated in prior and subsequent cases of constitutional
interpretation: what is the role of the court and the state in defining
the morality of the American people? While the Casey plurality
rejects the notion that the state should impose its moral imperatives
on pregnant women," this is by no means a widely shared view. The
5. Id.
6. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, reprinted in THE PORTABLE
NIETZSCHE 93, 95 (Walter Kaufmann ed. and trans., 1976) (1882).
7. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
8. Id. at 850.
9. ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM FROM
DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 375, 378 (Walter Kaufmann ed. and trans., 1989).
10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 850.
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dissenters in Casey were incensed that the Court was imposing its
own moral imperatives, a job they viewed as specifically reserved for
the legislatures and the democratic process.1 4 While the existentialists
offer no definitive answer on the role of the democratic process in
creating moral imperatives for society, one scholar describes a general
suspicion among the existentialists of democracy and democratic
ethics for its "slave morality" and its "cater[ing] to the vulgar many at
the expense of the ... few."
15
There are only a limited number of issues that come before the
Supreme Court that require the Court to make philosophical
judgments regarding life, death, and other intimate issues. Thus, it is
not surprising that the famous words of the Casey plurality regarding
existence and philosophical privacy have appeared in only two other
decisions by the Supreme Court: Washington v. Glucksberg,
6 where
the Court upheld a Washington state law banning physician assisted
suicide, and Lawrence v. Texas,17 where the Court struck down a
Texas law banning consensual homosexual sex. These two cases
reexamine the philosophical privacy described in Casey, and reach
two different conclusions on its relevance to the constitutional issues
at hand. Lawrence in particular gives us a clue to the future of the
right articulated in Casey, and the changing role of morality in the
American legal and political systems.
II. Existentialism
Beginning this discussion, it is important to attempt a definition
for the philosophy with which I wish to examine the right to privacy
as interpreted in Casey, Glucksberg and Lawrence. Existentialism has
been described as a philosophy, a school of thought, and a movement,
but all these descriptions are heartily rejected by existentialist
scholars. 8 These labels are problematic because existentialist thought
is comprised of the ideas of a wide variety of thinkers, philosophers,
and writers who have completely disparate ideas about the society,
religion, life, humanity, philosophy, politics, art, etc. Calling
14. Id. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. Werner J. Dannhauser, Existentialism and Democracy, in CONFRONTING THE
CONSTITUTION 399-401 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990).
16. 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997).
17. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
18. WALTER KAUFMANN, EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 11
(1989).
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existentialism a "sensibility, '"1 9 Walter Kaufmann describes some of
the common themes found in the work of existentialist thinkers: "The
refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repudiation of the
adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially of systems,
and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as
superficial, academic, and remote from life."'2  Other scholarsdescribe the existentialist "sensibility" this way: "Generally
speaking... freedom of choice, individual dignity, personal love, and
creative effort are the existentialist values, and.., the most important
among these are freedom of choice and individual dignity. 21
For the purposes of this note, I have focused on four primary
themes, culled from the work of a variety of existentialist writers and
critics including Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Sartre, Jaspers, andNietzsche, among others. Specifically, the themes focused on in this
essay are the rejection of traditional philosophical notions,denunciation of traditional religion as the source of truth and
morality, the exaltation of individual choice and experience, and the
acceptance of life as pain and suffering.
A. Rejection of Traditional Philosophy and Eternal Truth
In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard writes,
"the paradoxical character of the truth is its objective uncertainty...
The eternal and essential truth, the truth which has an essential
relationship to an existing individual.., is a paradox., 22 From thebroader perspective of existentialism, Kierkegaard is essentiallydescribing the paradox of Platonic Truth, or the theory of "Forms,"
an ideal reality that Plato posited as existing separate from human
consciousness.' To Kierkegaard, the truth could not exist without a
relationship to the individual, and thus it was necessarily subjective.
Using the example of love to demonstrate the inherent subjectivity of
all things, he wrote, "Love is falling in love... Love does not exist as
something objective but comes into being every time a man loves, andit exists only in the lover; not only does it exist for the lover but it
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id.
21. Paul V. Regelbrugge, Barbarism in the Plastic Bubble: An Application ofExisentialist Theory to Capital Punishment in the United States DET. C. L. REV. 1011, 1019(1990).
22. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT 183 (David F.
Swenson trans., 1968).
23. PLATO, TIMEAUS, reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF PLATO 1178(Huntington and Cairns eds. Princeton U. Press 1980).
exists only in the lover."2
From Franz Kafka's perspective, we see an even more stark
expression of the absence of objective truth. To Kierkegaard, at least,
who never relinquished his Christian beliefs, faith was a form of
truth.2 Kafka, on the other hand, did not believe that any
explanation for existence was possible, that the "truth" was
unknowable. In discussing the Greek myth, Prometheus, Kafka
wrote: "The myth tries to explain the unexplainable. As it comes out
of a ground of truth, it must end again in the unexplainable."26 For
Kafka, the truth was that there was no truth-or at least not a
cognizable truth. As Kaufmann explains, "it is for the sake of truth
that Kafka eschews reduction to a single explanation. The world that
confronts us, and our life in it defy any attempt at a compelling
exegesis: that life lends itself to many interpretations is of its
essence."
27
B. Rejection of Religion as an Intellectual and Moral Guide
Though Kierkegaard and other existentialist thinkers did not let
go of their faith and belief in traditional religion, many existentialist
writers viewed religious doctrine in the same way that they viewed
other forms of philosophy-as purely subjective forms of belief.
Nietzsche, for example, wrote, "faith means not wanting to know
what is true." He expanded on this idea in a famous passage from
The Gay Science: "'Whither is God' he cried. 'I shall tell you. We
have killed him - you and I... What did we do when we unchained
this earth from its sun? ... God is dead. God remains dead. And we
have killed him."' 29 Nietzsche is describing the effects of the search
for truth on religious faith. Once it is determined that truth is
subjective, the idea of an essential truth stemming from God is no
longer plausible. Sartre sums up this point of view in his work,
Existentialism: "The existentialist... finds it extremely embarrassing
24. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, ON AUTHORITY AND REVELATION: THE BOOK ON
ADLER, OR A CYCLE OF ETHICO-RELIGIOUS ESSAYS, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM
FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 105,109 (Walter Kaufmann ed. and trans. 1989).
25. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, reprinted in
EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE, 110, 111 (Walter Kaufmann ed. and
trans., 1989).
26. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 143 (quoting FRANZ KAFrKA, THE CASTLE).
27. Id. at 143-144.
28. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 19 (quoting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
ANTICHRIST).
29. NIETZSCHE, supra note 6, at 95.
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that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility
of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be
any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness
to think it."'
C. Exaltation Experience and Individual Choice
Individual choice and the value of experience are two themes
that recur in many of the works of existentialist thinkers. Walter
Kaufmann writes of Kierkegaard that he criticized the Greeks and
Christians because "they have tried to escape the need for choices."31
Further, Kierkegaard viewed traditional philosophy as a "self-
deception.., an unrelenting effort to conceal crucial decisions that
we have made and must make."32 Kierkegaard wrote "[o]ne may
liken dread to dizziness. He whose eye chances to look down into the
yawning abyss becomes dizzy.., dread is the dizziness of freedom. 33
Thus, in choosing to avoid dreaded choice, humans have also chosen
to avoid beloved freedom.
To the existentialists, the very nature of the ideas they were
propounding was that life must be experienced rather than merely
contemplated, making writing about philosophy only second best to
living it. Kaufmann describes the impulse for the work of Karl
Jaspers as "a dissatisfaction with mere doctrines and the conviction
that genuine philosophizing must well up from a man's individual
existence and address itself to other individuals to help them to
achieve true existence." 3 This sentiment was common among the
existentialists. As Ranier Maria Rilke wrote in Letters to a Young
Poet:
[H]ave patience with everything unresolved in your heart and
to try to love the questions themselves as if they were locked
rooms or books written in a very foreign language. Don't search
for the answers, which could not be given to you now, because
you would not be able to live them. And the point is, to live
everything. Live the questions now. Perhaps then, someday far
in the future, you will gradually, without even noticing it, live
30. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM, reprinted in
EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 345, 353 (Kaufmann ed. and trans.,
1989).
31. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 17.
32. Id.
33. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF DREAD, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM
FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 101,105 (Kaufmann ed. and trans., 1989).
34. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 23.
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35
your way into the answer.
To the existentialists, true living was found in the individual's
experience of life-even a life that was full of hardship and travail.
D. Acceptance of Life as Pain and Suffering
Another common theme among the work of existentialist
thinkers is the acceptance of life as full of pain and suffering. Once
one has accepted the absence of a higher truth, and of a God to create
a purpose for humanity, one recognizes the inherent emptiness of
life. 6 But this is not to say that the existentialist is a pessimist. Once
humans come to this realization, they can accept life, live it to its
fullest extent, and even find their own salvation.37 Kaufmann
describes this aspect of Sartre's work:
Man is free; but his freedom does not look like the glorious
liberty of the Enlightenment; it is no longer the gift of God.
Once again, man stands alone in the universe, responsible for
his condition, likely to remain in a lowly state, but free to reach
above the stars.
Albert Camus expressed this acceptance of the tragic nature of
human existence in his work, The Myth of Sisyphus, in which he
relates the tragic myth of a man who, in punishment, must push a
huge rock up a slope, only to have it roll back on its own weight.39 He
describes the human condition as tragic, absurd, and tortuous, and
man himself as powerless, rebellious, wretched, and scornful.40 Yet,
Camus goes on to point out the essential duality of life: in the absurd,
one finds joy and mastery of one's own destiny. "There is no sun
without shadow, and it is essential to know the night.,
41
III. A Brief History of the Right to Privacy
To examine the parallels between existentialist philosophy and
the right to philosophical privacy as formulated by the Casey
plurality, it is necessary to trace the development of the right from its
35. RANIER MARIA RILKE, LETrERS TO A YOUNG POET 34-35, reprinted in AHEAD
OF ALL PARTING: THE SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE OF RANIER MARIA RILKE
(Stephen Mitchell, ed. and trans., Modern Library 1995).
36. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 46-47.
37. Id. at 46.
38. Id. at 47.
39. ALBERT CAMUS, supra note 9, at 375.
40. Id. at 376-378.
41. Id. at 378.
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first promulgation in Griswold v. Connecticut.4 2 In that case, brought
by a married couple, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that
banned the use of contraceptives. 3 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, did not ground his finding of a right to privacy in the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment." Rather, he located this
right in the "penumbras," or shadows, of the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments. His version of the right had a very
spatial aspect, which he described as a "zone of privacy., 46 This zone
was primarily located within the confines of the marital home and
relationship. Justice Douglas wrote: "Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. 47 Thus, the earliest
notions of the right to privacy were much different than they are
today. They focused on the marital relationship, and the intimacies of
that relationship that occurred inside the home.
Just a few years after Griswold was decided, the Supreme Court
expanded the right to privacy in a decision that many say opened the
door to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade one year later.' In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,9 the Court struck down a Massachusetts law that
prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. °
The case was brought on behalf of a sex educator who had distributed
contraceptive foam to a single female without a prescription after a
lecture on the campus of Boston University," and it transformed the
right to privacy from the narrow holding in Griswold to something
much broader.
First, the decision took the right of privacy outside the marital
bedroom of Griswold into the public sphere, by focusing on a statute
that prohibited not the use of contraception, but the distribution of
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 484.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 485.
47. Id. at 485-86.
48. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the
1971 Term through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357, 364 (1999).
49. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
50. Id. at 454.
51. Id. at 440.
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it.52 Second, the decision conferred the right of privacy given to
married people in Griswold on individuals, both married and single. 3
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child. 4
This language was used by Justice Brennan to frame the issue in
Eisenstadt as one of Equal Protection." However, his use of the
phrase "bear or beget" opened the door for the Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade, one year later, by linking the right to privacy specifically
to the issue of abortion.
In Roe v. Wade, 6 the Supreme Court firmly rooted the right to
privacy in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
Furthermore, it extended the right to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. 8 While the Court expanded
the spatial, marital, and decisional aspects of the right to privacy as
enunciated in Griswold and Eisenstadt by adding the right to
terminate a pregnancy, the Court's decision in Roe did not
fundamentally alter the right to privacy.59 While determining that
abortion was, in fact, a fundamental right,6° the decision in Roe also
served to limit the right to privacy. As Justice Blackmun wrote:
The privacy right involved ... cannot be said to be absolute. In
fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici
that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy
previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has
refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. 61
This limiting language in Roe allowed the Court to reexamine its
52. Id. at 446.
53. Id. at 453 (citations and emphasis omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 447.
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. Id. at 153.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 154.
60. Id. at 152.
61. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
Summer 20041 FROM KIERKEGAARD TO KENNEDY
620 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [31:4
holding twenty years later in the decision that is the foundation of this
essay, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.6 In that case, the Court backed
away from its holding in Roe that abortion was a fundamental right.63
The plurality opinion, while not "overrul[ing] Roe's essential
holding," dramatically changed the way abortion was viewed under
the Constitution." The language used by the plurality to define a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy turned from "fundamental
right" to "liberty., 65  Additionally, rather than limiting the state's
interest in potential life to after the point of viability as the Court had
done in Roe,6 the Casey plurality wrote that "there is a substantial
state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy." 67 This meant, in
the plurality's view, that the state could regulate abortion at any time
and in any manner as long as it did not impose an undue burden on a
woman's right to seek an abortion. 6'
What is exceptional about Casey is that the plurality proposes
these sweeping changes to the Roe regime, while at the same time
proclaiming the existence of a right to philosophical privacy "central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 69 While
many view the enunciation of this new aspect of the right to privacy
as mere dicta,0 the language of the Casey plurality decision is
undeniably linked to the themes of existentialist philosophy. It has
been used in subsequent cases to evaluate new questions that arise
under the right to privacy implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and implicates larger questions of the role
of morality in our system of constitutionally based democracy.
IV. Existentialist Analysis of Casey
The language of the Casey plurality is virtually incomparable to
anything previously written by the Supreme Court and is perhaps the
most "philosophical" language the court has ever put its name to. It
is arguable that this kind of writing has no place in the Supreme
62. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63. Id. at 869.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
68. Id. at 878.
69. Id. at 851.
70. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Court's constitutional jurisprudence." But as the existence of this
language shows, in the plurality's own words, "[a]bortion is a unique
act."72  In accordance with this realization about abortion, the
plurality sets a unique tone for its opinion:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.
It is difficult to read these words without conjuring up images of
the existentialist philosophers, and it is thus appropriate that the
decision in Casey implicates some of the central themes of that
philosophy, such as the rejection of traditional notions of right and
wrong, a dismissal of Judeo-Christian morality as a guide for social
legislation, and a prioritizing of individual experience above majority
rule. Since Casey's time, this language has been utilized in other
Supreme Court decisions that focus on the acceptability of morality-
based legislation,74 and it is possible that this employment of
existentialist philosophy may provide us with clues as to the future of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding moral questions. It is
with this in mind that we turn to the existentialist critique of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.
A. Rejection of Traditional Philosophy
In the famous passage citied above, the plurality seems to be
echoing one of the main tenets of existentialist thought. That, at least
with regard to the issue of abortion, there is no "truth" in the Platonic
sense of the world. One critic of the Casey decision writes:
Having so defined liberty, Justice O'Connor has adopted the
existential premise that there is no preexisting right or wrong,
no objective truth that informs or limits individual choice. She
has in the name of constitutional law borrowed a page from
Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness in which Sartre claims
that each individual human being has absolute freedom of
choice without regard for consequences of for societal norms."
71. See, e.g., id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
73. Id. at 851.
74. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997); Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 574.
75. Herbert W. Titus, Defining Marriage and the Family, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
327, 336 (1994) (footnote omitted). Titus wrongly attributes the above quoted passage
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To the contrary, the Casey plurality merely seems to accept that
we as a society do not know whether abortion is acceptable or
intolerable, whether it is a mere medical procedure or murder,
whether it is "right" or "wrong." As Kierkegaard notes, "what is in
itself true may in the mouth of such and such a person become
untrue. 7 6 Similarly, the plurality writes:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we
suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral
and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its
earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive
to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control
our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code. 77
Therefore, the State should not attempt to dictate whether
individuals can act on these widely varying beliefs. The plurality
recognizes that the essence of the abortion issue is a purely moral
question. Even Justice Scalia acknowledges this fact in his dissent:
"There is of course no way to determine [whether the fetus is merely
potentially human] as a legal matter; it is in fact a value judgment.
Some societies have considered newborn children not yet human, or
the incompetent elderly no longer so. '78  Though Justice Scalia
believes that it is wholly appropriate for the state to legislate on such
matters,79 the plurality decision suggests that it is a question that can
never be answered with a yes or a no by the courts or the legislatures.
B. Religious Disparity in the Abortion Discourse
One of the defining characteristics of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on abortion is the refusal to accept traditional religious
morality as a basis for constitutional interpretation. Abortion is an
anathema to most religious traditions because it is believed that a
fetus is a person, and taking that life through abortion is the
equivalent of murder. ° One scholar has suggested in response to the
existentialist language of the Casey plurality that "to claim that one
from Casey to Justice O'Connor. However, the language comes from a plurality decision
with no single cited author.
76. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, supra note 22, at 181.
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
78. Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. John Comyn, Restoring our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process, 8 TEx. REV.
L. & POL. 1, n.42 (2003) (discussing the official position of the Catholic Church, "which
characterizes abortion as an 'abominable crime"').
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has the right to define one's own meaning, existence, universe, and
the mystery of human life is to claim that one is God.""1 In his
condemnation, this scholar has gotten it exactly right. Sartre himself
once wrote: "man is the being who wants to be God."' But, as noted
above, the existentialist perspective, like the perspective of the Casey
plurality, rather than trying to replace God, is looking for direction
after accepting that God does not exist (i.e. that religion cannot act as
our moral compass). As one writer put it, "the Sartrean view [is] that
we are not bound by nature or God to any fixed way of being."
'
Though the Casey plurality does not directly address the religious
aspects of the abortion debate, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers
v. Hardwick sums up well the plurality's position:
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn
the behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose
their judgments on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of
secular legislation depends instead on whether the State can
advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity
to religious doctrine. 4
C. Individual Autonomy, Personal Choice and Experience
The crux of the legal question in Casey is one that the
existentialists gave utmost importance: the question of choice.
Alongside choice exists the deeply held existentialist values of
personal experience and individual autonomy. As one scholar
characterizes the existentialist views: "human beings create and
define themselves through their choices and acts." 5  Therefore,
"'choice' ... is a higher value than any traditional concept of a fixed
moral code."' Likewise, the Casey plurality finds that, "[t]he destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place 
in society. ''
They write that Casey involves "personal decisions concerning not
only the meaning of procreation but also.., responsibility [... ] for
it."'' Like Rilke, the plurality is announcing: "You must change your
81. Herbert Titus, supra note 74, at 338.
82. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 47 (quoting Jean-Paul Sartre, L'etre et le neant).
83. David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 975, 983 (1992).
84. 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
85. Smolin, supra note 82, at 981.
86. Id. at 983.
87. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
88. Id. at 853 (emphasis added).
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life."' 9 It is not the place of society or the legislature to do it for you.
What follows is that a woman must have the ability to choose whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy.
D. Acceptance of Pain and Suffering
The plurality in Casey seems to accept this essential existentialist
premise. Life can be painful, and that humans will encounter tough
decisions. The Court is by no means promoting abortion as a "good"
thing. However, it has accepted abortion as a tragic and necessary
party of the human condition. "[A woman's] suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision
of the woman's role.... "90 The plurality describes abortion as "an
act fraught with consequences" and pregnancy as an anxiety
provoking, painful sacrifice that women have endured from the
beginning of the human race.9' Their willingness to continue to
condone abortion is nothing more than an acceptance of this pain and
suffering, and an understanding that humans must experience it if
they are ever to find their own salvation.
One concurring Justice in Casey does not limit his discussion of
existence and the universe to the issue of abortion. In an ultimate
existentialist gesture, Justice Blackmun takes a few sentences of his
decision to contemplate his own mortality: "I am 83 years old. I
cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down, the
confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue
before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice
between the two worlds will be made." 2 This melding of judicial
opinion and personal reflection is reflected in the tone of
Dostoevsky's narrator in Notes from the Underground, described here
by Kaufmann: "it is man's inner life, his moods, anxieties, and his
decisions, that are moved into the center until, as it were, no scenery
at all remains. '
V. Morals-Based Legislation and the Role of Courts
With the statement that its obligation is not to "mandate [its]
89. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 30 (quoting Ranier Maria Rilke) (emphasis added).
90. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 943.
93. KAUFMANN, supra note 18, at 13.
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own moral code"94 the plurality in Casey is touching upon a question
that is at the heart of this case as well as other right-to-privacy cases:
what is the role of government in moral decision-making? The
dissenters in Casey clearly believe this is the province of state
legislatures.95  The plurality, on the other hand, suggests that
questions of morality are for the individual to decide; yet even by
making this claim, the Court is imposing its own perspective on
society, implicating questions of the legitimacy of judicial review.
Still, in keeping with their existentialist perspective-its primacy of
the individual and rejection of traditional systems of belief-the
plurality is consistent in expressing the view that individuals should be
allowed to determine their own moral code.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Casey expresses a vastly different view
than the plurality of the Court's role in the abortion debate.
However, his opinion is not necessarily as at odds with the plurality's
as he suggests. He writes that the court is substituting "value
judgments" for constitutional interpretation." And further, that
"value judgments should be voted on, not dictated. 9 7 Justice Scalia is
agreeing with the plurality that the Court should not be making moral
decisions, but he is also taking issue with the plurality for even setting
forth an opinion as to who should be making these decisions. For
Justice Scalia, it is solely the province of legislatures to mandate a
moral code for society and the Court should not interfere with this
legislative decision making at all.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun directly challenges
Justice Scalia's claims that the legislature is the correct forum for
moral decision-making. He writes,
But we are reassured, there is always the protection of the
democratic process. While there is much to be praised about
our democracy, our country since its founding has recognized
that there are certain fundamental liberties that are not to be
left to the whims of an election. A woman's right to
reproductive choice is one of those fundamental liberties.
Accordingly, that liberty need not seek refuge at the ballot
box.98
Justice Blackmun explains what Justice Scalia seemingly fails to
consider: that a popular vote on issues such as abortion, or laws
94. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
95. Id. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1000-1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 943.
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passed by legislatures, or decisions by an "imperial judiciary, ' are all
equally dictatorial. Justice Blackmun quotes the plurality, saying
"[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom
the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law isirrelevant."" He has distilled the reason why the legislative process
is not equipped to handle the question of abortion: it takes into
account the will of those to whom the issue is practically irrelevant.
Essentially, decisions regarding abortion should not be majoritarian
decisions, but rather, should be made by those who are directly
affected by them. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun supports the power
of the Court to weigh in when states are not protecting the interest of
this relevant minority. He writes that if the Court were to follow
Justice Scalia's advice and "get out of this area,"'' it would be
abdicating its constitutional responsibility.'"
Justice Kennedy takes a similar tone as Justice Blackmun whendiscussing whether judicial review is appropriate in the realm of
moral issues. In Casey, he joins the plurality, whose opinion on this
issue is discussed above. It is in other cases that Justice Kennedy
really expresses his views on this matter. In his dissent in U.S. v.
Lopez,'0 3 Kennedy echoes Justice Blackmun's opinion that the
constitutional structure requires the Court to play a role in answering
these types of questions. °m
First, in discussing whether the federal government has a role in
regulating areas that are generally seen as the province of the states,
Kennedy writes: "Judicial review is [...] established beyond question,
Marbury v. Madison, [citation omitted], and though we may differ
when applying its principles, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, ... its legitimacy is undoubted."'0 5
Kennedy further discusses the relationship between the states and the
federal government, a precarious balance that the Court is often
asked to help maintain. He quotes The Federalist No. 51 to support
his view that the federal system is necessary to protect individual
liberty:
99. Id. at 997.
100. Id. at 925.
101. Id. at 1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 943, n.12.
103. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
104. Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105. Id.
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Though on the surface the idea may seem counterintuitive, it
was the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by
the creation of two governments, not one. 'In the compound
republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself., 06
According to Justice Kennedy, the very structure of the federal
government provides protection for individual rights."° If the federal
and state governments, and every branch found within, fulfill their
constitutional duties, the rights of the individual will be protected.
Poe v. Ullman,"°8 decided a few years before Griswold, provides
nice insight into the views of past Supreme Court Justices on the
question of whether a state should legislate on moral issues, and
whether the Court may review such "democratic" decisions. Justice
Douglas writes:
We should say with Kant that 'It is absurd to expect to be
enlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to
her what side of the question she must adopt.' Leveling the
discourse of medical men to the morality of a particular
community is a deadening influence."
While Justice Douglas goes on to recognize that legislatures often do
and must legislate in the realm of morality, he sees that this ability
must be limited through mechanisms such as judicial review: "to say
that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee of
the Constitution may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to
override specific guarantees so long as what it does fails to shock the
sensibilities of a majority of the Court.
'
"
110
Justice Harlan takes a slightly different tone when discussing the
power of the state to infringe on individual freedom by legislating
morality. While recognizing the state "has traditionally concerned
itself with the moral soundness of its people, '.' he suggests, like the
106. Id. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No.
51, at 323 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
107. Id.
108. 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
109. Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting EMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF
PURE REASON, 42 Great Books, p. 221 [sic]).
110. Id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, "2 discussed above, that limitations
should be placed on this power."3 Justice Harlan argues that where
the state is acting solely to "protect the moral welfare of its citizenry,"
and in doing so is infringing on a basic right, the state is acting in an
unconstitutional manner." ' He writes that "the mere assertion that
the action of the State finds justification in the controversial realm of
morals cannot alone justify any and every restriction it imposes."''.
However, Justice Harlan also approaches such moral questions
with great hesitancy and expresses a restrictive view of the Court's
role in weighing in on such issues."6 He admits that the state'sjudgment on personal issues such as abortion and homosexuality are
no more correct than the judgment of the Court or of individuals."7
He even suggests that had the case in question been one of abstract
moral principles, he would question the Court's role in the decision
making process:
If we had a case before us which required us to decide
simply, and in abstraction, whether the moral judgment
implicit in the application of the present statute to married
couples was a sound one, the very controversial nature of
these questions would, I think, require us to hesitate longbefore concluding that the Constitution precluded
Connecticut from choosing as it has among these various
views."'
The existentialists' view of morality is largely a product of the
rejection of a traditional religious understanding of the world. For
the (non-Christian) existentialists, the end of belief in religion has set
humanity morally adrift." 9 Nietzsche's view is particularly bleak:
"'All lacks meaning.' (The untenability of one interpretation of the
world, upon which a tremendous amount of energy has been lavished,
awakens the suspicion that all interpretations of the worlds are
false.)"'2 ° But, other existentialist thinkers offer more of a solution
for moral direction than Nietzsche suggests. Rather than just accept,
112. See, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Poe, 367 U.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 547.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM
FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 130, 131 (Kaufmann ed. and trans. 1989).
120. Id.
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as Nietzsche has, that no moral or ethical truth exists, Kierkegaard
urges one to find direction in oneself: "I must find a truth that is true
for me ....,,2 Kierkegaard also tells us where not to look in the
search for truth: "Politics, etc., have nothing to do with 'eternal
truth.""22  One scholar has suggested that the existentialist
perspective on law and morality is similar to John Stuart Mill's theory
of liberty, which argues that the power of the state should be limited
to the prevention of harm to others and the state has no authority to
dictate its own moral code through legislation.' 3 Thus, from an
existentialist perspective, the state certainly should not prescribe
individual morality; rather, it is up to individuals to create their own
moral code.
VI. Casey's Legacy
The legacy of Casey, with its existentialist undertones, is still
being developed in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and the end
result of this kind of judicial thinking is in no way clear. The
plurality's language from Casey regarding existence has been quoted
in only two other Supreme Court cases to date, both significantly
related to the existentialist themes discussed above, and ultimately
turning on the question of whether the state may regulate an
individual's moral decisions. In one of these cases, Washington v.
Glucksberg,'24 the Court backed away from the philosophical privacy
promulgated in Casey when it upheld a Washington State law banning
physician-assisted suicide. But six years later, the Court once again
embraced the notion of philosophical privacy with its decision in
Lawrence v. Texas,"' overturning a state anti-sodomy law.
A. The Right to Die
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court confronted the question
of whether there exists a "liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment which extends to a personal choice by a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician assisted
121. Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia, Existentialism (2004), available at
http://encarta.msn.com (quoting SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE JOURNALS)
122. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, "THAT INDIVIDUAL": TWO "NOTES" CONCERNING MY
WORK AS AN AUTHOR, reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE
94, 97 (Kaufmann ed. and trans. 1989).
123. David M. Smolin, supra note 83, at 981.
124. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
125. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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suicide." '126 The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the
existentialist freedom promulgated in Casey extended to the right to
die.127 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist notes, "that
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
decisions are so protected... and Casey did not suggest otherwise."'
In further trying to limit the effect of the expansive language of
Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist directly confronts the duality of the
plurality's philosophical stance regarding questions of existence: "The
opinion [in Casey] moved from the recognition that liberty necessarily
includes freedom of conscience and belief about ultimate
considerations to the observations that 'though the abortion decision
may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than
a philosophical exercise.' ' 129 Thus, just four years after the Casey
decision, the Court had essentially attempted to limit the application
of the doctrine of existentialist freedom. But not all the Justices
agreed. Justice Stevens, for one, refused to allow the majority in
Glucksberg to deny the strength of the plurality decision in Casey." °
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens reinvigorates the
opinion of the Casey plurality by pointing out that that case actually
affirmed the rights of individuals to make personal decisions when
their interests outweighed those of the state.' Justice Stevens
compares the Glucksberg case to that of Cruzan v. Department of
Public Health,32 where the Court affirmed the right of a mentally
competent individual to refuse life sustaining medical treatment, and
concludes that questions regarding assisted suicide were within the
contemplation of the plurality decision in Casey. He writes:
Whatever the outer limits of the [right to privacy] may be, it
definitely includes protection for matters "central to
personal dignity and autonomy."... Avoiding intolerable
pain and the indignity of living one's final days incapacitated
and in agony is certainly "[a]t the heart of [the] liberty... to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
126. 521 U.S. 702, 705-708 (1997).
127. Id. at 726.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood-v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)).
130. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 744 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
universe, and of the mystery of human life."
133
Justice Stevens' opinion on the matter of decisions regarding life
and death echoes the existentialist philosophers in that he accepts the
fact that individuals have vastly differing opinions about what is
"right."' 34 He makes a strong argument that legislative decision-
making regarding such deeply personal issues is inappropriate
because in passing laws on the matter, the democratic system
necessarily disregards the deeply held beliefs and choices of many
citizens:
Some find value in living through suffering; some have an
abiding desire to witness particular events in their families'
lives; many believe it a sin to hasten death. Individuals of
different religious faiths make different judgments and
choices about whether to live on under such circumstances.
There are those who will want to continue aggressive
treatment; those who would prefer terminal sedation; and
those who will seek withdrawal from life-support systems
and death by gradual starvation and dehydration... "[N]o
uniform collective decision can possibly hope to serve
everyone even decently.,
135
Furthermore, promoting the existentialist notion of
individualism, Justice Stevens points out that the state interest in
protecting human life is in fact an aspect of "individual freedom"
rather than a "collective interest.'
' 36
Despite this convincing argument by Justice Stevens, the Court
found that the individual liberty expressed by the Casey plurality did
not extend to the right to assisted suicide. 37 It appeared that the
"existential privacy" promulgated in Casey was to be limited to
certain situations regarding unwanted pregnancies.
B. The Right to Sexual Intimacy
This limited applicability of the Casey plurality's language
remained intact for six years, until the Court's recent decision in
Lawrence v. Texas.'38 In that decision, the Court struck down a Texas
law that proscribed consensual same-sex sexual acts, finding that it
infringed on the individual's right to liberty as protected by the Due
133. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 744 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
134. Id. at 746.
135. Id. at 747 (quoting R. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 213 (1993)).
136. Id. at 746.
137. Id. at 735.
138. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
139
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy's wholehearted adoption
of the ideas expressed in Casey puts to rest any doubts about the
applicability and relevance of the existentialist language in that
opinion. The same type of philosophical freedom expressed in Casey
is echoed in the first paragraph of the Lawrence decision: "Freedom
extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both
in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions."' 4  With this
language, Justice Kennedy is clearly attempting to reinforce the idea
of philosophical privacy promulgated by the Casey plurality, and is
formulating a right to privacy that encompasses most individual moral
decisions.
In Lawrence, the Court engaged in another discussion of the role
of morality in legislation and judicial review. The majority expressed
the view taken by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe:141 if moral
condemnation is the only justification for a law that attempts to
regulate deeply personal issues, that law violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The condemnation [of homosexual conduct] has been shaped
by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which
they aspire and which thus determine the course of their
lives. These considerations do not answer the question
before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the
whole society.42
One scholar argues that the decision in Lawrence marks a
turning point in Supreme Court jurisprudence permanently away
from condoning morals-based legislation.'13 This is the same criticism
voiced by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Lawrence. Justice Scalia
argues that "state laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
139. Id. at 578.
140. Id. at 562.
141. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
142. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
143. Saama Saifee, Note, Penumbras, Privacy, and the Death of Morals-Based
Legislation: Comparing U.S. Constitutional Law with the Inherent Right of Privacy in
Islamic Jurisprudence, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 370, 446 (2003).
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obscenity are.., sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of
laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called
into question by today's decision." 1" In Justice Scalia's view, it is
perfectly acceptable for laws to be based on notions of morality. He
argues that the promotion of "majoritarian sexual morality"'46 is a
legitimate state interest, and specifically, that Texas' anti-sodomy law
"seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual
behavior are 'immoral and unacceptable.",1
47
It is difficult to accord the views of the Lawrence majority with
those expressed in Justice Scalia's dissent. Clearly, these two sides of
the Court have vastly different views of the role of law in society.
One scholar claims that the disparity in these opinions is actually
based on fundamentally different understandings of morality itself.'
He writes:
Justice Scalia understands morality to be obedience to a set
of rules established by higher authority. If one believes that
morality constitutes an authoritative code of conduct, it is
not only reasonable but imperative for the democratic
majority to enact this code of conduct into law. The moral
understanding of the majority is fundamentally different...
Consistent with [the "mystery of life" passage in Casey] is
the idea that "intimate and personal choices" constitute
moral choices only if individuals are free to make those
choices. The essence of morality is the power to choose right
from wrong. When choice is taken away from the individual,
it is no longer a question of morality, but a question of law.
The decision of the majority in Lawrence distinguishes
"essentially moral choices" from legal imperatives.Y
This description of the Lawrence majority's view on morality
seems to be exactly in line with the views promulgated by the
existentialist thinkers discussed above. The majority's opinion
expresses a clear rejection of traditional notions of right and wrong,
not only in the overruling of its own precedent,5 ° but in its rejection
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
148. Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in
Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 91 (2003).
149. Id. at 91-92.
150. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.").
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of eternal truths'5 ' and of religious morality. '52 It also promotes the
values of individual choice and self-determination as well as an
acceptance of suffering if that is truly what one's own decisions will
lead to.'5 3 It seems that the Supreme Court (at least a majority of it)
has finally taken the advice of the existentialists, and, in Justice
Scalia's words, has "effectively decree[d] the end of all morals
legislation.""
VII.Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey is
a landmark decision, not only because of its substantial effect on
abortion rights, but also because of its introduction of existentialist
philosophy into constitutional jurisprudence. The plurality opinion in
Casey wholly embraced the fundamental tenets of existentialist
philosophy, including its rejection of the idea of eternal truth and
religion as a moral guide for society, its exaltation of individual choice
and autonomy, and its acceptance of the pain and suffering as part of
the human condition.
Casey also marked the continuing evolution of the right to
privacy. First promulgated in Griswold v. Connecticut as implicit in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to
privacy was limited in a spatial sense to the marital home or bedroom,
and in the relational sense, in its application only applied to married
couples. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the right was enlarged to include
public acts and conferred specifically on individuals. That case
opened the door for the right of privacy to be expanded, in Roe v.
Wade, to encompass the decision whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy. In Casey, decided nearly 20 years after Roe, the right to
privacy was yet again transformed through the existentialist language
of the plurality's decision, to include a liberty interest in philosophical
and moral privacy, and personal autonomy.
The Casey plurality deemed that the right to make moral
decisions regarding intimate issues should be the sole province of the
151. Id. at 579 ("[L]aws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress.").
152. Id. at 571 (citing and rejecting Chief Justice Burger's statement in Bowers that
"[c]ondemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
153. Id. at 578 ("The State cannot... control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.").
154. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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individual. By taking this stance, the Court brought into the
discussion the larger question of morals-based legislation, and its
implications for judicial review and the democratic process, issues
that have been debated throughout the long history of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Due to the absence of a clear majority in Casey,
however, the Court's view on the issue of morals-based legislation
was never fully articulated.
Casey's legacy can be clearly tracked through the limited number
of cases that have used its notorious language in their interpretations
of the right to privacy. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court
wrestled with the precedent set forth in Casey, and ultimately deemed
that the liberty interest expressed there did not extend to the right to
assisted suicide. Finally, Lawrence v. Texas marks the most recent
evolution of the right to privacy, and an embrace by a majority of the
Court of many of Casey's foundational ideas. In that case, the Court
reaffirmed that the individual has the sole right to make certain
intimate, philosophical and moral decisions and took a firmer stance
on the issue of morals-based legislation. In accord with its
existentialist leanings, the Court suggested that morals-based
legislation has a very limited place in the American legal system.
The legacy of Planned Parenthood v. Casey lives on. After
Lawrence, it seems clear that the existentialist values set forth by the
Court in Casey will play a continuing role in the Supreme Court's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
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